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Since the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in 1997, the ﬁnancial sector in Asian coun-
tries has been experiencing a period of consolidation. But at the time of the
crisis, local currencies and equity prices plummeted, and real estate bubbles
burst. Reduced collateral values, meanwhile, put banking institutions un-
der severe stress, but worse still, the number of nonperforming loans soared,
intensely shaking the ﬁnancial sector. Because one of the suspected culpable
factors at the root of the banking crisis was overcompetition, that is, there
were too many banks in the market, policymakers were committed to re-
ducing their number in an attempt to solve the crisis. Among the methods
to accomplish this, policymakers seemed particularly to favor bank merg-
ers (Shih 2003, 32). To cite a few examples, in 1998, the governor of the cen-
tral bank of the Philippines stated, “The central bank favors mergers as a
way to keep the number of bank failures to a minimum . . .” In the mean-
time, the Malaysian government urged that all banks be merged into six,
which later became ten, and soon thereafter Taiwan’s president announced
the so-called Second Phase of Financial Reform, which invigorated banks
to consolidate or form strategic alliances with foreign ﬁnancial institu-
tions. Thus began the welcoming of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) that
were about to start their new journey across the wide ﬁnancial landscape
of Asia.
Before the crisis, foreign banks were, for the most part, restricted from
entering Asian ﬁnancial markets, but to be sure, the markets became much
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teresting, if not even puzzling, to try to better understand whether the de-
terminants of mergers and acquisitions of ﬁnancial institutions were diﬀer-
ent before and after the Asian crisis.
The purpose of this chapter is to empirically investigate whether the
Asian crisis has changed the determinants of cross-border mergers and ac-
quisitions among ﬁnancial institutions in ten Asian countries. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to explore the impact of the Asian
crisis on the determinants of cross-border M&A activity among ﬁnancial
institutions. In this line of research, most of the relevant literature has fo-
cused on Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries (Fecher and Pestieau 1993; Focarelli and Pozzolo 2000,
2001, 2005), European countries (Campa and Hernando 2006; Altunbas
and Marques 2004), high-income countries (Portes and Rey 2005), and the
United States and four European countries (Vasconcellos and Kish 1998).
Two exceptions are the works of Buch and DeLong (2004) and Giovanni
(2002) who use some 150 countries in their sample, but their studies neither
cover the period of the Asian crisis, nor do they take similar crises, such as
the European currency crisis and the Tequila crisis, into account. Because
the Asian crisis signiﬁcantly changed the attitude of governments toward
M&As, it is expected that the present study that focuses on Asian countries
and the Asian crisis should complement existing studies considerably.
To be more speciﬁc, some parallels can be drawn between our chapter
and others in the ﬁeld of location choice, the study of the determinants of
choosing a city to set up subsidiaries, branches, representative oﬃces, and
agents by foreign banks. Brealey and Kaplanis (1996), for example, used
the location of the overseas oﬃces of 1,000 of the world’s largest banks to
examine the determinants of foreign bank location. Shen and Chou (2007)
recently study the determinants of foreign banks’ choice of Asian cities to
establish new branch oﬃces, and they point to a signiﬁcant relationship 
between the choice of bank location, foreign trade, and foreign direct in-
vestment. Our chapter, however, diﬀers from those studies in that it focuses
on cross-border consolidation rather than the establishment of foreign
oﬃces.2Our chapter diﬀers from the past studies in three aspects. First, be-
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1. For example, in Singapore, the authority announced a ﬁve-year program to liberalize
access by foreign bank. See the appendix for the openness of each country.
2. In a broad term, our chapter is also part of foreign direct investment. Most studies of for-
eign direct investment is related to economic growth. For example, De Mello (1999) reported
that in the ﬁrst international capital ﬂow, foreign direct investment, inﬂows appear to enhance
economic growth in both developing and OECD countries, but Borenzstein, De Gregorio, and
Lee et al. (1998) found that the positive eﬀects of foreign direct investment can only be detected
when a recipient country has a suﬃciently high level of human capital. Carkovic and Levine
(2005), however, concluded that foreign direct investment does not have an unconditional ro-
bust, positive eﬀect on economic growth but that rather the eﬀect is dependent on national in-cause we compare the determinants before and after the Asian crisis, our
sample periods cover a long span from 1990 to 2006. Past studies focus on
the determinants that may aﬀect M&As and do not consider the related
important event that may change the impact of the determinants. Also, the
studies commonly are limited to one particular year.
Next, our study belongs to the “from-many-to-many” category in the
ﬁeld of multinational enterprises, which means that acquirers are from
many countries, and their targets are in many countries. In this regard,
Clarke et al. (2001) have explained that from-many-to-many studies are
probably fewer in number because of diﬃculties associated with data col-
lection. Because our samples include “all” M&As of ﬁnancial institutions,
not only in Asia but also G7 countries, as the acquirers, our chapter could
be the most comprehensive study of M&As in Asian ﬁnancial institutions.
Third, our ﬁnancial institutions contain all targets, and acquirers in the
ﬁnancial industry from Asian countries are included. The ﬁnancial insti-
tutions include investment banks, mutual funds, insurance and security
companies, banks, credit unions, credit cooperatives, and so on. Therefore,
the use of ﬁrm-level data is not possible because except for banks, other
ﬁrm-level data are not available. Even the bank-level data is not available
before 1995, making the use of ﬁrm-level data impossible.3
There are very few theories about cross-border M&As among ﬁnancial
institutions, which explains the rationale behind the fact that most current
empirical studies borrow theories from international trade. And this chap-
ter is not an exception. We explore whether the following ﬁve existing hy-
potheses are related to cross-border M&A activity in Asian countries. They
are the gravity hypothesis, following the client hypothesis, market opportunity
hypothesis, information cost hypothesis, and the regulation barrier hypothe-
sis. These ﬁve hypotheses are explained in detail in the following section.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides a survey of the
literature. Section 6.3 presents the empirical model, and section 6.4 gives
the source of the data and the basic statistics. Section 6.5 summarizes the
estimated results of our model, and section 6.6 presents the estimated re-
ports of the robustness testing. Section 6.7 reviews the conclusions.
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come, school attainment, and so on. For a survey, see Prasad et al. (2003). Wei (2001) studies
the eﬀect of taxation and corruption on international direct investment from fourteen source
countries to forty-ﬁve host countries; he ﬁnds that increase in either the tax rate on multi-
national ﬁrms or the corruption level in the host governments would reduce inward foreign di-
rect investment. Wei (2000b) points out the corruption can be interpreted more broadly as
“poor public governance” rather than as bureaucratic corruption narrowly deﬁned, and the
corruption in a developing country may increase its chances of suﬀering a crisis.
3. Therefore, those using cross-border ﬁrm-level data to do the location choice studies fo-
cus only on banks. Also, because researchers’ bank-level data is taken from BankScope, a
data bank launched in the market in 1995, its coverage of the earlier years is limited, especially
before 1996.6.2 Literature Review on Cross-Border Consolidation
There is a paucity of studies in the literature related to the determinants
of M&As of ﬁnancial institutions, largely stemming from the fact that
some researchers may have been impeded by problems with data collection
and by the fact that cross-border M&As in the ﬁnancial sector have been
relatively rare. This section introduces the ﬁve hypotheses we examine.
It is noted that though the conditions discussed in the following are
mostly based on bank systems or regulations, our data contains other type
of ﬁnancial institutions. We use only bank conditions on regulation be-
cause similar types of data for other ﬁnancial institutions are released less
often. Thus, our results should be interpreted cautiously.
6.2.1 Gravity Hypothesis
The gravity hypothesis, ﬁrst adopted by Tinbergen (1962), explains trade
ﬂow between two countries, say iand j, using two masses, usually gross do-
mestic product (GDP) and distance, where the former and the latter are
suggested to have positive and negative eﬀects, respectively. Most com-
monly, distance has been reported to have a very signiﬁcantly negative im-
pact on M&As among ﬁnancial institutions. This is slightly mystifying
given that most assets in ﬁnancial institutions are “weightless,” and dis-
tance is not a good proxy for transportation cost in transacting ﬁnancial
assets (Portes and Rey 2005).
As regards this conundrum, Portes and Rey (2005) suggest that distance
might also be a proxy for information asymmetry. To explain, countries that
are geographically near each other tend to know more about each other, 
either because of direct interaction between their citizens for business or
tourism or because of more extensive media coverage. Thus, the signiﬁcance
of distance may reﬂect the validity of the gravity hypothesis or the asym-
metric information hypothesis.
Our model considers GDP after logarithmic transformation (GDP) and
distance (DISTANCE) as the measures of the gravity hypothesis.
6.2.2 Following the Client Hypothesis
Following the customer is a defensive expansionary strategy that argues
that international ﬁnancial institutions follow their customers when they
go abroad in order to protect their existing relationship with them. See
Williams (2002) for a detailed survey. The typical proxy for this hypothesis
is the trade (that is, the sum of exports and imports) between two countries.
However, Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005) propose a similar but broad term
that they refer to as “economic integration.”
This chapter follows the convention by using the degree of openness 
of the country, that is, the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP
206 Chung-Hua Shen and Mei-Rong Lin(TRADE), to proxy this concept. The following the clients hypothesis sug-
gests that TRADE should be positively related to M&As.
6.2.3 Market Opportunity
The decision to expand abroad is likely spurred by banks’ search for
proﬁt opportunities beyond those oﬀered by traditional banking activity at
home. Banks in a more proﬁtable, better-developed banking sector in their
home country most probably have a competitive advantage over their com-
petitors in the destination market. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) use the to-
tal credit of the banking sector (measured as the ratio of total credit to
GDP) and the average return on assets (ROA) of banks in home countries
as proxies for market opportunity. They ﬁnd that the two variables are pos-
itively related to international expansion. Also, economic growth in the
host market is important. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) also point out that
the individual bank’s size is another critical factor.
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000) deﬁne market opportunity such that it in-
cludes the expected rate of economic growth and banks’ eﬃciency in the
destination country. The use of the former is the same as that in their 1991
paper, but the use of the latter is probably dependent on the individual
banks they adopt, which allows them to estimate banks’ eﬃciency. They
then investigate those factors that aﬀect foreign shareholding. Vasconcel-
los and Kish (1998) study the M&A activity between the United States and
four European countries (France, German, Italy, and the United King-
dom) and ﬁnd that an increase in stock returns in the United States dis-
courages the foreign acquisition of American ﬁrms. Conversely, an in-
crease in European country stock returns results in an escalation in the
acquisition of American ﬁrms. Thus, increases in the stock returns of ac-
quirers seem to augment acquisitions, but an increase in the stock returns
of target companies has the opposite eﬀect.
In this study, our market opportunity hypothesis comprises the expected
rate of economic growth and expected stock returns eﬀect on M&As. For
the former, given the currently fast economic growth, we surmise that ac-
quirers may continuingly feel optimistic about the future economic growth
of the target market. This optimistic economic growth view suggests that
the impact of the economic growth is positive. Focarelli and Pozollo’s
(2000) ﬁndings, for example, support the optimistic economic growth view
because they ﬁnd that banks prefer to invest in countries with high ex-
pected rates of economic growth.
On the other hand, given the high stock prices, the cost of acquiring costs
is too high because the high stock price is not sustainable. Thus, potential
acquirers likely tend to wait for the next opportunity, making the impact
negative. Vasconcellos and Kish’s (1998) ﬁndings support the high stock
cost view. They found that a depressed U.S. stock market relative to foreign
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proxy for market opportunity in our chapter is the expected GDP growth
rate at time t   1 (GDPGROW) and expected stock returns at time t   1
(STOCKRET).
6.2.4 Information Cost Hypothesis
Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) contend that such eﬃciency barri-
ers as distance as well as diﬀerences in language, culture, currency, and reg-
ulatory/supervisory structures inhibit cross-border bank mergers within
Europe. Buch and DeLong (2004) examine three diﬀerent measures of in-
formation cost, that is, distance, common language, and common legal
system. They ﬁnd that partners in bank mergers tend to speak the same
language and to be close in terms of geographical distance. DISTANCE is
also the proxy for the information cost hypothesis because, as mentioned
earlier, countries that are in close geographical proximity tend to know
more about each other.
Many studies have shown that foreign direct investment is negatively re-
lated to information cost (Sabi 1988; Dunning 1998; Kim and Wei 1999).
That is, large foreign direct investment means that ﬁrms are familiar with
the transaction behavior of the host countries, which in turn reduces in-
formation cost. Therefore, foreign direct investment could also include the
cost of the information. Accordingly, our information cost covers common
language (LANGUAGE), common religion (RELIGION), and distance
(DISTANCE). The former two are dummy variables, that is, if the shared
oﬃcial language is English, for instance, or the shared religion is the same,
the dummy is unity; otherwise, it is zero. For example, in our sample, the
oﬃcial language of Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippines and India is
English (see the World Bank Web site) Thus, their LANGUAGE is uni-
form. DISTANCE refers to geographic distance, which is published in the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Factbook.
It is important to note that the movement of a variable may be the inter-
active outcome of more than one hypothesis. For example, DISTANCE
may reﬂect both the gravity hypothesis and informational friction, where
both indicate a pull factor for acquirers.
6.2.5 Regulatory Restrictions
It is conceivable that the attitude toward M&As by the local authority of
a particular country could be a critical factor in aﬀecting a ﬁrm’s decision
as to whether to engage in a cross-border M&A. On the one hand, putting
explicit limits on cross-border M&As or blocking single takeovers would
deﬁnitely reduce the number of the cross-border M&As, and more than
that, regulatory restrictions would, in all likelihood, reduce the interna-
tional competitiveness of banks, thereby hindering their opportunities for
international expansion. On the other hand, restrictions could reduce the
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ship between banks and depositors more transparent; in an environment
with such regulatory restrictions, those banks would likely have a greater
incentive to expand their activities abroad in order to bypass their home
country’s restrictions.
Two categories of regulatory restrictions are often used. The regulatory
restrictions here are considered in a broad sense, and, as such, they include
the rule of law as well as those governing institutional quality. Restrictions
that comprise the ﬁrst category of regulatory restrictions are related to the
rule of law, institutional quality and government eﬀectiveness. Thus, the
proxies include legal origin (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998 [LLSV]), regulatory
burden and corruption, as well as rule of law (Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Zoido-Lobaton [KKZ] 2002). Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000) claim that, as
a rule, countries with a relatively more eﬃcient judicial system are pre-
ferred by foreign acquirers because their market transactions would be bet-
ter guaranteed. Note that Galindo, Micco, and Serra (2003) do not use
these regulatory indexes to measure cross-border activities but argue that
it is the diﬀerences between home and host countries that have positive
eﬀects on bilateral cross-border banking activity.
The second category of regulatory restrictions are taken from Barth 
et al.’s (2000, 2006) survey and comprise restrictions on banking activities
in securities, insurance, and real restate, with higher values denoting more
stringent restrictions. Shen and Chang (2006) hypothesize that though
these restrictions may harm the performance of banks, sound government
governance can reduce the adverse eﬀects. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000) ar-
gue that these restrictions may be a proxy for actual limitations on ﬁrms
from entry into a country from abroad. Both their 2000 and 2001 results
show that stricter restrictions actually reduce the number of acquisitions.
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) ﬁnd similar results.
We adopt two sets of regulatory variables. The ﬁrst set is related to 
government governance. We adopt KKZ’s indexes of corruption
( KKZ_CORRUP), rule of law ( KKZ_RULELAW), quality of regula-
tion ( KKZ_REGQUAL), and government eﬃciency ( KKZ_GOVEFF).
The indexes of KKZ are renewed every two years and contain six gover-
nance clusters. Wei (2000a, 2001) also mentioned the importance of gover-
nance in studying cross-board capital ﬂow. See table 6.1 for the deﬁnition
of each proxy. Recall that Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Galindo, Micco,
and Serra (2003) suggest using the diﬀerence of indexes as one of the de-
terminates. Following their procedure, we also use the gap indexes, which
are denoted as  KKZ. Then we proceed to examine whether these regula-
tory gap indexes are related to those countries’ ﬁrms’ propensity to engage
in cross-border M&A activity. Thus, while the original KKZ’s indexes
range from –2.5 to 2.5 (see table 6.1), with a higher number denoting bet-
ter governance, the transformed gap indexes now range from –5 to 5. And
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Variable Deﬁnition Source
DISTANCE Compute as the shortest line between two countries’  CIA
commercial centers according to the degrees of latitude 
and longitude
GDP GDP in billion US. dollar in 2000 WDI
TRADE Bilateral trade volume (import   export) between acquirer DOTSY
and target country divided by GDP.
GDPGROW (%) GDP growth rate WDI
STOCKRET (%) Stock return DY
LANGUAGE Dummy variable set equal to 1 if the same legal system  CIA
prevails in the target and acquirer country, 0 otherwise
RELIGIOUS Dummy variable set equal to 1 if the same religious prevails CIA
in the target and acquirer country, 0 otherwise
KKZ_CORRUP Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (KKZ) index variable WB
measures the Control of Corruption dimension. The KKZ 
index is measured in units ranging from about –2.5 to 2.5, 
with higher values corresponding to better governance.
KKZ_RULELAW KKZ index variable measures the Rule of Law dimension.  WB
The KKZ index is measured in units ranging from about –2.5 
to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance.
KKZ_REGQUAL KKZ index variable measures the Regulatory Quality  WB
dimension. The KKZ index is measured in units ranging from 
about –2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better 
governance.
KKZ_GOVEFF KKZ index variable measures the Government Effectiveness WB
dimension. The KKZ index is measured in units ranging from
about –2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better 
governance.
RESTRIC_S Index of the restrictions on Bank’s operation in Securities Barth, Caprio, 
sector; range from 1 to 4 with a higher value indicating a  and Levine (2000, 
more restrictive environment 2006)
RESTRIC_I Index of the restriction on Bank’s operation in Insurance  Barth, Caprio, 
sector; range from 1 to 4 with a higher value indicating a  and Levine (2000,
more restrictive environment 2006)
RESTRIC_E Index of the restriction on Bank’s operation in Real Estate  Barth, Caprio,
sector; range from 1 to 4 with a higher value indicating a  and Levine (2000,
more restrictive environment 2006)
RESTRIC_NF Index of the restriction on Bank’s holding in Nonﬁnancial  Barth, Caprio, 
Institution; range from 1 to 4 with a higher value indicating and Levine (2000, 
a more restrictive environment 2006)
Sources: CIA: Central Intelligence Agency Web site; DOTSY: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook,
published by IMF; DY: DataStream and Yahoo! WB: World Bank Web site, www.worldbank.org. WDI:
World Development Indicator, 2006.the better the governance in the home country is, the greater is the propen-
sity for ﬁnancial institutions in the host country to be mergered.4
The second set of regulatory variables comprises restrictions on 
banking activities that engage in securities ( RESTRIC_S), insur-
ance ( RESTRIC_I), real estate ( RESTRIC_R) and nonﬁnancial
( RESTRIC_NF). (See Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2000.) We perform
similar transformations to use gap indexes. In this case, the gap series range
from –3 to 3. Therefore, the higher the number of the gap indexes is, the
more restrictive the acquiring country is relative to the target country.
6.3 Econometric Model
We use the number of M&As as our dependent variable for the follow-
ing two reasons. First, we study whether the Asian crisis has changed the
attitude toward the consolidation. For example, it is generally thought that
the authority is more welcome to the foreign buyers after the crisis. Thus,
the number of transactions seems preferable to reﬂect this attitude change.
The value of transaction, however, is often more related to the perfor-
mance and ﬁnancial condition.
Next, the data of value of transaction are often unavailable to the public
because the actual money transaction is sometimes a business secret. The
data of the number of M&As are complete and thus are a more accurate
measure in this case.
We, therefore, employ the Poisson regression model given our depend-
ent variable is countable numbers. That is,
(1) Nij   exp[    1XD    2X(1   D)   εij],
where i and j denote the home i and host country j, respectively, thus, Nij is
the number of M&As, between home country i and host country j, D is the
dummy variable of the Asian crisis, which is equal to unity before the cri-
sis and zero after it. X is the vector of the explanatory variables,  1 and  2
are the corresponding coeﬃcients of the explanatory variables before and
after the crisis, respectively, and ε represents errors.
Our X contains the ﬁve sets of variables, representing the ﬁve aforemen-
tioned hypotheses. We ﬁrst examine any combination of two hypotheses
and then gradually expand to three and four to avoid multicollinearity.
6.4 Data Description and Basic Statistics
Our selection of M&A data is based on the following simple rules. First,
all targets and acquirers in the ﬁnancial industry from Asian countries are
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4. Note that Galindo, Micco, and Sierra (2003) also take the absolute value of the diﬀer-
ences.included. Furthermore, to examine the robustness, all acquirers from G7
countries are included. Next, the announcement day of M&As is used in-
stead of the day the transaction is complete. This is simply because the for-
mer is available consistently, but the latter is often lacking the complete day
and is diﬃcult to deﬁne. Third, our ﬁnancial institutions include banks, se-
curity houses, insurances, mutual funds, and so on, which help us to know
the impact of the crisis on the ﬁnancial industry. Fourth, the sample period
covers January 1, 1990, to December 31, 2006.
We divide the whole sample into pre- and post-Asian subsample using the
year of 1998 for the following reasons. Following the Thai Baht’s devalua-
tion in mid-1997, the region entered severe economic crisis. Growth was
negative in 1998 in most countries in the region. The economics indexes
have shown dramatical changes in 1998. Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini
(1998) and Berg (1999) all point out a change in the Asian ﬁnancial market
in 1998.
Table 6.2 reports the number of M&As before (1990 to 1997) and after
(1999 to 2006) the crisis. Five particularly interesting results emerge. First,
the number of M&As is much higher after the crisis than before it. For ex-
ample, for Singapore, the number before and after the crisis is 72 and 165,
respectively; for Malaysia, 51 and 92, respectively; and for Hong Kong, 42
and 86, respectively. Therefore, Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong are
the three most active acquirers in the postcrisis period. Furthermore, in
terms of the percentage, the acquiring rate of Singapore is the highest, up
to 6 percent. The higher number after the crisis is probably because of the
policy of openness toward the ﬁnancial consolidation after the crisis. It is,
nevertheless, diﬃcult for the present chapter to examine the eﬀect of pol-
icy on the consolidation. See the appendix for the policy of openness.
Second, as it has the highest number of thirty-four and forty-one in tar-
gets before and after the crisis, ﬁnancial institutions in Hong Kong are the
most likely targets for consolidation. Indonesia has the second largest
number of targeted ﬁnancial institutions.
Third, Japan shows the most asymmetric patterns as a target and an ac-
quirer. It acquires 100 foreign banks, but only ten Japanese ﬁnancial insti-
tutions are acquired in all sample periods. This asymmetric attitude that
Japanese ﬁnancial institutions can buy foreign banks but foreigners are not
welcome to buy Japanese ﬁnancial institutions is worth future study. An
opposite asymmetric case can be found in Thailand. That is, seventy-ﬁve ﬁ-
nancial institutions from Thailand are the targets, but only ﬁfteen are ac-
quirers.
Fourth, during both periods, in India, M&A activity is almost nonexist-
ent, while in Indonesia and Thailand, it is negligible. Furthermore, though
few targets and acquirers are found in Taiwan, there is a moderate increase
in the number of acquirers after the crisis. Finally, and somewhat bewilder-
ing, the number of M&As in Malaysia is relatively high.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.But the ﬁnancial centers that they are, Hong Kong and Singapore report
the greatest amount of M&A activity. Overall, in light of the preceding ba-
sic statistics, it is abundantly clear that there is a sharp escalation in num-
ber of cross-border M&As after the Asian crisis.
Table 6.3 presents the mean of each of the explanatory variables before
and after the crisis. Of particular interest here are three ﬁndings, as sum-
marized in the following. First, the level of GDP and TRADE are two vari-
ables that are obviously higher after the crisis, in large part because of
higher economic growth. If the gravity hypothesis holds, then we can sur-
mise that, ceteris paribus, M&A activity may have also increased. Some-
what surprisingly, the values of GDPGROW and STOCKRET do not al-
ways increase after the crisis.
Third, the  KKZ regulatory gap indexes are overwhelmingly negative
for India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Because these gap in-
dexes are the indexes of acquiring countries minus those of target coun-
tries, the negative signs indicate that target countries have higher regula-
tory indexes than do these four countries.
Contrasting the  KKZ regulatory gap indexes in the preceding, the pos-
itive gap indexes for Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan signify that ﬁrms
in those three countries have a greater tendency to form partnerships with
targets from countries with lower indexes. As much as the former four
countries (India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand) have a smaller
number of cross-border M&As compared with the latter three (Hong
Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan), which have greater number of M&As, it
seems to follow that ﬁnancial institutions in countries with sound gover-
nance tend to consolidate ﬁnancial institutions in countries with less-
sound governance.
6.5 Empirical Results
A note must be made about the design of the methodology we employ
for our estimations. In this study, we test ﬁve hypotheses, each of which
contains more than two proxies; if we were to consider all of them in the re-
gression, then we would have to estimate around twenty-two parameters.
We must bear in mind that this would surely result in complex results on
account of complex collinearity. The problem would be aggravated if we
were to further divide the sample into two periods, as the number of un-
known parameters would then be doubled. Therefore, we ﬁrst take diﬀer-
ent pairs of hypotheses into account and then gradually increase the num-
ber of hypotheses.
Table 6.4 reports our estimated results based on diﬀerent pairs of hy-
potheses. The numbers shown in the top row indicate that there are ten
speciﬁcations, where the estimated results of each speciﬁcation are further
divided into two columns, that is, before and after the Asian crisis.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.We ﬁrst discuss the estimated results that pertain to the gravity hypoth-
esis. The coeﬃcients of DISTANCE are overwhelmingly signiﬁcantly neg-
ative regardless of speciﬁcation. For example, in the ﬁrst column, they are
–0.62 and –0.61 before and after the Asian crisis, respectively; hence, the
gravity hypothesis gains momentum and support here.
This likely reﬂects the commonly-held notion that the greater the dis-
tance is, the higher the transaction cost is; if so, then this conceivably re-
duces the likelihood of ﬁrms engaging in transnational M&A activity. This
result is similar to that of Buch and DeLong (2004). While this result is
consistent with our earlier conjecture, in our case, it goes against our judg-
ment because, as mentioned earlier, ﬁnancial assets are mostly intangible,
and transportation cost should not be of concern. One alternative expla-
nation might be that distance is a proxy for the information asymmetry.
When two countries are in close proximity, the extent of information asym-
metry is substantially reduced, thus encouraging M&A activity.
The coeﬃcients of GDP are mostly signiﬁcantly negative both before
and after the Asian crisis, compelling us to discount the gravity hypothesis
in this case. The negative impact, however, is counterintuitive because
GDP is the proxy for the mass in the gravity theory, and the mass attracts
investors. One plausible explanation, nevertheless, is that a large GDP is
typically diﬀerent from GDP per capita, where the former is the proxy for
the gravity hypothesis but the latter is related to the wealth of people. That
is, countries with a high GDP do not necessarily attract more investors if
the people in those countries are poor (i.e., GDP per capita is low). For ex-
ample, there are many M&As in Singapore, but in the region, its GDP
ranks second from the bottom. By way of comparison, not many M&As
take place in Japan, but in the region, its GDP is the highest. The implica-
tion here could be that a lower GDP may be associated with greater M&A
activity and vice versa.
Therefore, GDP per capita might be a better proxy than GDP to repre-
sent the gravity. We thus repeat the exercise but use GDP per capita as the
proxy and ﬁnd its coeﬃcients are positive. We discuss this issue in the ro-
bust testing.
The coeﬃcients of TRADE are also overwhelmingly signiﬁcantly posi-
tive, lending support to the following the client hypothesis. For example, in
the ﬁrst column, the coeﬃcients are 0.32 and 0.35 in the pre- and postcri-
sis periods, respectively, which is a strong indication that greater trade be-
tween two countries increases the tendency for their ﬁnancial institutions
to merge. This is similar to the situation in India and the Philippines. They
have the lowest TRADE, and interestingly enough, they also have the
fewest M&As. The situation in Singapore and Japan is just the reverse. The
following the client eﬀect is stronger after the crisis when TRADE is used.
The results for the market opportunity eﬀect reveal an interesting pat-
tern. The coeﬃcients of GDPGROW are negative and positive for the pre-
and postcrisis, respectively, regardless of speciﬁcation. Three of the four
The Determinants of Cross-Border Merger and Acquisition Activity 217speciﬁcations with negative coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, whereas only one
with a positive coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant. A negative sign before the crisis
harnesses does not support the optimistic economic growth view. Recall
that GDPGROW is the GDP growth rate at t   1. Thus, during periods
when economic growth in a host country is negative, potential acquirers
likely hold the view that the downturn will be short-lived and that more
promising times are ahead, prompting them not to consociate with ﬁnan-
cial institutions in the host country. Against this, a positive coeﬃcient af-
ter the crisis seemingly supports the optimistic economic growth view but
to a lesser extent.
The coeﬃcients of STOCKRET are insigniﬁcant for most speciﬁcations,
except for one that is signiﬁcantly negative before the Asian crisis. Thus, the
high stock cost view exists weakly. With the results of GDPGROW and
STOCKRET taken together, the Asian crisis strengthens the motivation of
the market opportunity hypothesis, though the eﬀect is weak. We also use
GROWTH and STOCKRET at time t   2 to proxy the expectations about
future economic and stock market conditions, but the results do not change
qualitatively. See results in the section of robust testing.
The coeﬃcients of LANGUAGE, while all positive, are dramatically dif-
ferent for diﬀerent sample periods in the statistical sense. Before the crisis,
however, only two of four are signiﬁcant, but after the crisis are over-
whelmingly signiﬁcant. Furthermore, the coeﬃcients are much larger after
the crisis than before it. Accordingly, the problems caused by information
cost are more severe after the crisis because M&A activity is more likely to
go on in those countries where the same language is spoken. Before the cri-
sis, even two ﬁrms sharing common language does not help M&A activity.
However, these results may not be surprising given that, in our sample, most
M&As take place in Hong Kong and Singapore, where English is the oﬃ-
cial shared language.5
The impact of RELIGION on M&A activity is similar to those of
LANGUAGE. Before the crisis, only two of four are signiﬁcant though all
of the coeﬃcients are positive. After the crisis, all of the coeﬃcients are
overwhelmingly signiﬁcantly positive. It can be surmised that before the
Asian crisis, it did not help ﬁrms consolidate if they come from countries
that share the same religion, but after the crisis, it certainly did.
Information cost, therefore, when proxied by language and religion, re-
ceives increasing attention by investors when they engage in consolidation.
This evidence is also found by Qiu and Zhou (2006), Rossi and Volpin
(2004), and Buch and DeLong (2004). We conjecture that this is because
the same culture could shorten the friction periods between two ﬁnancial
institutions, for example, whether speaking the same language is impor-
tant when the targets and acquirer are from Asian countries.
218 Chung-Hua Shen and Mei-Rong Lin
5. Results here are based on oﬃcial language announced by the Central Intelligence
Agency.The crisis evidently changed the impact of corruption on M&A activity.
For both periods, the coeﬃcients of  KKZ_CORRUP are overwhelm-
ingly positive, but only those before the crisis are signiﬁcant. Readers are
reminded that the gap index is the diﬀerence between the corruption index
of acquirers and that of targets. Hence, a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient means that
there is a larger gap in the corruption index between two countries and that
this does indeed encourage ﬁrms to engage in M&A activity. That is, before
the crisis, ﬁnancial institutions in countries with low corruption are more
likely to acquire ﬁnancial institutions in countries with high corruption.
After the crisis, this corruption gap has no inﬂuence on ﬁrms’ willingness
to take advantage of M&A opportunities.6
The crisis evidently did not change the impact of rule of law as the co-
eﬃcients of  KKZ_RULELAW are all insigniﬁcant in both periods.
The eﬀect of  KKZ_REGQUAL is interesting from two perspectives.
First, those coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant are all negative. Second, the co-
eﬃcients are about equal in size before and after the crisis. A negative co-
eﬃcient means that ﬁrms in countries with eﬃcient regulation quality are
less interested in buying in those countries with poor regulation quality.
Combining the results here with those obtained from corruption, we can
conclude that countries with little corruption but less regulation quality
tend to merge ﬁrms in the countries with greater corruption but more reg-
ulation quality.  KKZ_GOVEFF has no eﬀect on M&A activity as almost
none of the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant in both periods.
The results from using the KKZ gap indexes seem to suggest that regu-
lations are indeed associated with the willingness of ﬁrms from diﬀerent
Asian countries to partake in cross-border M&A activity. Especially perti-
nent here is that when corruption or regulatory quality are diﬀerent in the
home and host countries, it seems to prompt ﬁrms from those countries to
form partnerships (M&As) before the crisis but not after.
Table 6.5 repeats the estimation procedure as those of Table 6.4, but we
consider three hypotheses simultaneously. As most of the results are simi-
lar, we skip the discussion here.
Table 6.6 presents the results from using the restrictions on banks to en-
gage in security, insurance, real estate, and the nonﬁnancial industry to re-
place the KKZ regulatory variables. Recall that these restriction variables
are the restrictive indexes of acquirers minus the same indexes of targets.
The coeﬃcients of  RESTRCIT_S are all insigniﬁcantly positive before
the crisis and insigniﬁcant after the crisis for seven of the ten speciﬁcations.
Therefore, before the crisis, ﬁnancial institutions in countries that allow
banks to engage in securities tend not to form partnerships with those in
countries that do not allow banks to engage in that industry. Similarly put
consolidation is less frequent when the target country has relatively
The Determinants of Cross-Border Merger and Acquisition Activity 219
6. Wei (2000a,b, 2001) points out the corruption is similar to the tax in the foreign invest-



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.stiﬀened restrictions on banking activities. After the crisis, restrictions on
banking activities are not related to cross-border M&A activity.
The coeﬃcients of  RESTRICT_I are overwhelmingly signiﬁcantly
negative for both periods, which indicates that ﬁnancial institutions from
relatively less-restrictive countries with regard to insurance have a propen-
sity to engage in M&A activity with those from relatively more-restrictive
countries. Because the coeﬃcients in the two periods are similar, the crisis
does not aﬀect this pattern.
The pattern vis-à-vis  RESTRICT_R is ambiguous given that there are
both positive and negative coeﬃcients. Owing to the fact that the most of
the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are positive, we are inclined to say that, on bal-
ance, the variable has a positive eﬀect. That is, ﬁnancial institutions from
countries that are relatively more restrictive when it comes to real estate
tend to engage in M&A activity with those from countries that are rela-
tively less restrictive. Because the coeﬃcients are similar in both periods,
once again, the crisis does not aﬀect this pattern.
The coeﬃcients of  RESTRICT_NF are all signiﬁcantly positive. Thus,
ﬁnancial institutions from countries that are relatively more restrictive
when it comes to real estate tend to engage in M&A activity with those
from countries that are relatively less restrictive. Again, the crisis seems to
not have had too much impact on this pattern as the coeﬃcients in the two
periods are roughly the same or there is no clear pattern.
6.6 Robustness Testing
6.6.1 Using GDP per Capita as Proxy
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 report the estimated results using GDP per capita as
the proxy for the mass in the gravity hypothesis. Results, however, are sen-
sitive to diﬀerent speciﬁcations. When KKZ and bank restrictive variables
are not present in the regression, the coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcantly negative.
However, the results change to become signiﬁcantly positive when they are
added in.
6.6.2 Market Opportunity Using t   2
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 report the estimated results when GDPGROW and
STOCKRET use the future growth rate of t   2. Results change dramati-
cally because coeﬃcients of STOCKRET become almost all signiﬁcantly
positive. Therefore, the market opportunity hypothesis gains strong sup-
port if the acquirers look at the long-run eﬀect stock return two years
ahead. Results of GDPGROW, however, remain the same.
6.6.3 Acquirers from G7 Countries
Tables 6.11, 6.12, and 6.13add the estimated results by adding G7 coun-
tries. Results do not change signiﬁcantly except for the coeﬃcients of












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.LANGUAGE. Recall that its coeﬃcients are only signiﬁcant for two spec-
iﬁcations before the crisis without considering G7 countries. The coeﬃ-
cients now become overwhelmingly signiﬁcantly positive. This, thus, fur-
ther strengthens the importance of information cost, especially when
targets are from Asian countries.
6.7 Conclusions
We study the motivation that drives ﬁnancial institutions to engage in
cross-border M&A activity in Asian countries prior to and subsequent to
the Asian crisis. In other words, we delve into the impact of the Asian cri-
sis on the determinants of cross-border M&As in Asian countries. Before
discussing the conclusions, one caveat should be pointed out. While we
posit ﬁve hypotheses, their multiple proxies may yield mixed results. Fur-
thermore, some proxies may belong to more than one hypothesis. Thus, it
is uneasy to decisively reject or not reject the hypotheses by simply exam-
ining the signiﬁcance of proxies (which are also referred to as determinants
here). One way to overcome this shortcoming is to discuss more about the
inﬂuence of each determinant and less about whether each hypothesis is
supported or rejected. The conclusion can be highlighted in the following.
First, some determinants have an equal impact on M&A activity before
and after the Asian crisis. For example, DISTANCE has a negative impact
in both periods, which supports the gravity hypothesis and information
cost hypothesis. Gross domestic product also has a negative impact during
both periods, contrary to the gravity hypothesis in this case. The following
the client hypothesis is supported for both periods too, but only when
TRADE is employed as the proxy. When the value of the regulatory gap is
relatively small between two countries in terms of the number of restric-
tions on the banking industry engaging in insurance, then ﬁrms seem to be
encouraged to partake in cross-border M&A activity. By contrast, when
the value of the regulatory gap is relatively large between two countries in
terms of restrictions on nonﬁnancial activities, it encourages ﬁrms to en-
gage in M&A activity.
Next, some determinants are only eﬀective before the Asian crisis. For
example, GDP growth rate at t   1 has a negative impact before the Asian
crisis but no eﬀect after it. Thus, the market opportunity hypothesis was at
play before the crisis but was not important after it. Also, the gap in regu-
lation barriers between two countries, when proxied by the diﬀerences of
corruption, is also important before the crisis but is no longer crucial after
it. Thus, the regulation barrier hypothesis may have become less in force af-
ter the crisis.
Third, some determinants are only eﬀective after the Asian crisis. For ex-
ample, sharing a common language and being of the same religious faith
become more and more important in determining the extent of M&A ac-
230 Chung-Hua Shen and Mei-Rong Lintivity after the crisis. That is, the information cost hypothesis based on
these two determinants gains momentum after the crisis. Last, some deter-
minants seem to have no eﬀect whatsoever in both periods. For example,
future stock return does not have any impact in our sample.
Appendix
Indonesia
By the end of January 1998, further steps were taken on bank restruc-
turing with the granting of a full guarantee for all bank depositors and
creditors, together with the introduction of the Indonesian Bank Restruc-
turing Agency (IBRA).
The foreign holdings in domestic ﬁnancial institutions would be eased.
Korea
The government has been encouraging mergers between banks that are
both sound and of substantial size.
In 1998, regulation of 4 percent of commercial banks controlled by for-
eigners is lifted.
Malaysia
In 1998, Malaysia requests ﬁfty-eight ﬁnancial institutions merger into
ten large anchor banks.
The Philippines
In 1998, development cooperation, development assistance, and other
such topics were key, and they should not be hijacked by discussions of new
ﬁnancial system. There was a need for the international community to cre-
ate partnerships that met development needs. The international commu-
nity should also create the required resources for implementing the pro-
posals and commitments made in the major United Nations conferences.
In 1999, nine mergers involving twelve commercial banks, four thrift
banks, and two rural banks have taken place. All these measures promoted
the mobilization of more resources that will be made available to the market.
Singapore
In May 1999, MAS announced a ﬁve-year program to liberalize access
by foreign banks to the domestic banking industry. The ﬁrst package of
measures was deliberately calibrated to give local banks time to build their
capabilities and minimize the risk of destabilizing the ﬁnancial system.
On 29 June 2001, MAS announced the second phase of the liberalization
program, which will enable the broadening of access to the domestic whole-
The Determinants of Cross-Border Merger and Acquisition Activity 231sale banking industry. This will allow oﬀshore banks and qualifying
oﬀshore banks to develop their restricted bank status.
Taiwan
On December 13, 2000, Taiwan passed the Law of M&As of Financial
Institutions to encourage M&As. Foreign M&As are also allowed.
Thailand
In 1997, the Bank of Thailand said that restrictions on foreign holdings
in domestic ﬁnancial institutions would be eased. Domestically incorpo-
rated banks and ﬁnance companies “with sound ﬁnancial status” would be
allowed to hold 49 percent of other ﬁnancial institutions for ten years, the
central bank said. These measures will apply to ﬁfteen commercial banks,
thirty-three active ﬁnance companies, and twelve property ﬁnance compa-
nies that have not been suspended, the central bank said.
Foreign holdings in ﬁfty-eight bankrupt ﬁnance companies, whose ac-
tivities were suspended this year, will be unlimited for ten years. Currently,
foreign companies may hold no more than 10 percent of a bank and 25 per-
cent of a property ﬁnance company.
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Comment Mario B. Lamberte
The authors have observed a signiﬁcant increase in mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&As) in Asia after the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. Thus, they have at-
tempted to empirically investigate the determinants of cross-border M&As
among ﬁnancial institutions in ten Asian countries and to ﬁnd out whether
the determinants have changed after the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. They have
oﬀered ﬁve hypotheses, namely, the gravity hypothesis, following the client
hypothesis, market opportunity hypothesis, information cost hypothesis,
and regulatory restrictions hypothesis. Their empirical results conﬁrm
some of these hypotheses and also show some changes in eﬀects of the de-
terminants of M&As after the crisis.
These comments will focus on two areas, namely, data and interpretation
of the empirical results.
Data
The data used by the authors need some clariﬁcation as they aﬀect the
results as well as the interpretation of the results. First, they have classiﬁed
M&As by acquiring and target countries. It may be worthwhile to look at
nationalities of these ﬁnancial institutions as they provide additional in-
formation why a ﬁnancial institution in an acquiring country has merged
with a ﬁnancial institution in a target country. For example, a U.S.-
registered ﬁnancial institution owned by Hong Kong investors may merge
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